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Opinion: Why Merit Selection Is
Inconsistent with Democracy
Julius Uehlein* & David H. Wilderman, Esq.**
We should never lose sight of the fact that judges are people and
that their decisions are the product of their life experiences. Technical
expertise alone does not make a judge. If that were so, we could turn
judging over to computers. To the contrary, judges decide the most
important questions on the basis of their personal judgments made
within the permissible parameters of the law. Law is not a science; if it
were, it would be difficult to explain split decisions and appellate court
reversals. In reality, the law is a product of a person's reason and
judgients; therefore, the people making such judgments and their
orientation makes all the difference in their decisions and, ultimately, in
the interpretation of our laws.
The Pennsylvania AFL-CIO has opposed giving to a select few the
right of our members to participate in the selection process. Organized
labor views the merit selection (political appointment) process as a
wonderful public relations gimmick for disguising a power shift from
the people to an elite crew-a completely undemocratic process that
empowers non-elected lawyers and others to select judges with little or
no accountability to the people. Our democratic tradition is built on the
right to vote and those who seek to abolish that right should be required
to meet a heavy burden of overwhelming evidence. If the issue is close
it ought to be resolved in favor of this precious right. Not to value this
fundamental right highly would present a serious erosion of our
democratic form of government.
This is not to say that the present elective system is not without
problems. It would be wrong to assume, however, that a change to a
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different system would automatically bring about improvement. The
truth is that there are problems with both concepts. One who focuses
attention only on the evils of either system can easily find reason to
advocate the other. Wisdom may be derived only by comparing the
advantages as well as the deficiencies of both systems in order to
determine which is preferable.
Proponents of merit selection decry the potentially corruptive
influence of politics in general, and fund-raising in particular, upon the
judiciary. The public, they argue, neither knows enough about the
candidates to make an informed choice nor has sufficient interest in the
judiciary to learn about the candidates. These proponents of merit
selection complain that the public pays little or no heed to ratings of
candidates published by the various bar associations. They contend a
small group of highly informed individuals would do a better job than
such an uninformed public of identifying the best candidates for judicial
office.
What this argument fails to address, are the alternatives in addition
to "political appointment." Specifically, in a democracy, we vote for
virtually all public officials, such as jury commissioners. The better
alternative in a democracy is to improve the knowledge base of the
electorate. In judicial elections, labor spends considerable effort to
inform our members, and candidates appear before labor groups. In
addition, discussion on issues, ballot position reform, dropping country
of origin and public financing of campaigns are leveling reforms that
would create a more informed electorate.
As to the potential for corrupting political influence, it cannot be
seriously argued that appointment by a commission or governor is less
political; it is simply less public. Under political selection plans, the
governor not only makes the judicial appointment, but also picks the
pickers as well. The nominating procedure of the political parties may
be less visible than the ideal, but the selecting process of merit
commissions is invisible by comparison.
The precise reason a
particular candidate is passed over, in effect barred from seeking office,
is never revealed; yet, the stigma remains with that person forever.
Although the necessity for political contributions may be
lamentable, if not out-and-out distasteful, such contributions are
insulated to the extent that the support and any potential for influence is
diluted among the hundreds of thousands of voters without which a
candidate cannot succeed. It is, after all, the voter who puts a judge in
office. Contrasted with the individual campaign contributor, a member
of an appointive commission has an infinitely greater opportunity for
corrupt influence; there is no insulation there. If a committee member
is a lawyer, for example, every court of common pleas judge before

2002]

WHY MERIT SELECTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH DEMOCRACY

771

whom the member appears will know that this individual could hold the
key to that particular judge's future.
Further, substituting a commission for the voting electorate may
well result in depriving many of the opportunity to attain judicial office.
Many would be eliminated because they graduated from the wrong
school, or because their name ends in the wrong syllable, or because
they worship in the wrong place, or because they are not the right color
or sex. The commissions are dominated by lawyers who tend to be
senior partners at large, metropolitan firms. The selection process
yields to bluebloods at the expense of small offices or solo practitioners
or graduates of less prestigious law schools. The so-called merit
selectors, who are in reality political appointees, too often exclude
certain ethnic and religious groups from the bench.
Proponents of the political appointment system argue that the
present system resembles a lottery because candidates are generally
unknown and not screened for qualifications. Political appointment
supporters assert that the general public just does not have the
intelligence to make a good selection. Again, the term "qualified" is a
loaded term; its meaning depends upon who is using it. "Qualified"
may describe an individual who by experience and training is expert in
the subject matter of a particular kind of case. Others might argue that
qualified-and incidentally the word "qualified" can also be interpreted
as meaning meritorious--could describe a lawyer who strictly adheres
to the interests of legal precedence favoring one group or another.
Qualified or meritorious generally does not mean technically legally
qualified.
The role of politics in judicial selection is not as jaded as critics
would have us believe. There is benefit to previous political experience
shaping a judicial temperament that is responsive to the needs of
society. To be successful, a political campaign must be broad based,
exposing the candidates to the wants and needs of every element of our
society. Far from being corruptive, this exposure can be an invaluable
educational experience, a resource from which the candidate may later
draw in weighing competing interests to arrive at a rational and
equitable judgment. Because politicians must be sympathetic to social
trends and responsive to change to maintain their following, a political
background prevents a judge from ignoring these factors. After all,
judges are more than just lawyer-technicians; they are interpreters of
the law. They cannot fulfill that role without a vivid awareness of the
compelling needs of a changing society.
Specific reforms to the current electoral system would avoid the
lottery concerns, allow candidates to discuss issues, and eliminate
county designation or cross-filing. We can make the following
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improvements in the election process without denying citizens their
right to vote:
" instituting public financing of judicial campaigns, which could
involve a mix of public and private funding with limitations;
• requiring candidates to file statements of financial interest with
the Pennsylvania Ethics Commission;
" rotating ballot position by county or congressional districts;
" providing improved access to public television to promote
judicial candidates and education about the appellate courts;
" lifting the "gag rule" to let judicial candidates reflect their
philosophy and ideology without discussing the outcome of
particular decisions that might come before the courts; and
" eliminating retention by requiring judicial incumbents to seek
election based on their records of performance.
Retention elections are cosmetic and are not an acceptable substitute for
popular input in the initial selection process.
The AFL-CIO is concerned that resuscitating the political selection
of judges poses serious problems in a democratic society. The burden
to remove the right to vote falls on those who seek to narrow the
electoral process. Fundamentally, the issue devolves to the simple
question of to whom our judges are accountable. If the public is the
selection authority, accountability for career changes to appellate judges
encourages a general public accountability. Democracy is not easy. It
requires an informed electorate. Candidates must be given public
financing and allowed to speak on specific issues within reasonable
boundaries. The answer to these problems is not to be found in
limitations on the right to vote, but in expansions of the political
process.

